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Jihadism is a neologism referring to "militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West" and "rooted in political Islam".[1] Appearing earlier in Pakistani and Indian media, Western journalists adopted the term in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks of 2001.[2] It has since been applied to various insurgent and terrorist movements whose ideology is based on the Islamic notion of jihad.[3]

Contemporary jihadism ultimately has its roots in the late 19th- and early 20th-century ideological developments of Islamic revivalism, which developed into Qutbism and related ideologies during the mid-20th century.[]

The terrorist organisations partaking in the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979 to 1989 reinforced the rise of jihadism, which has been propagated in various armed conflicts throughout the 1990s and 2000s.[4][5] Gilles Kepel has diagnosed a specifically Salafi jihadism within the Salafi movement of the 1990s.[6]

Jihadism with an international, Pan-Islamist scope is also known as global jihadism. Studies show that with the rise of ISIL, many Muslims from Western countries like Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States traveled to join the global jihad in Syria and Iraq.[7][8][9][10]


Jihadist variation of the Black Standard as used by various Islamist organisations since the late 1990s, which consists of the Shahada in white script centered on a black background.

The term "jihadism" has been in use since the 1990s, more widely in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.[11] It was first used by the Indian and Pakistani mass media, and by French academics who used the more exact term "jihadist-Salafist".[Note 1][2][12]

According to Martin Kramer as of 2003, "jihadism is used to refer to the most violent persons and movements in contemporary Islam, including al-Qaeda."[2] David Romano has defined his use of the term as referring to "an individual or political movement that primarily focuses its attention, discourse, and activities on the conduct of a violent, uncompromising campaign that they term a jihad".[13] Following Daniel Kimmage, he distinguishes the jihadist discourse of jihad as a global project to remake the world from the resistance discourse of groups like Hezbollah, which is framed as a regional project against a specific enemy.[13]

Most Muslims do not use the term, disliking the association of illegitimate violence with a noble religious concept, and instead prefer the use of delegitimising terms like "deviants".[11][Note 2]

The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation to jihadism. Academic Manfred Steger proposes an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies (these include al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Hamas, and Hezbollah, which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism").[15]

"Jihad Cool" is a term for the re-branding of militant jihadism as fashionable, or "cool", to younger people through consumer culture, social media, magazines,[16] rap videos,[17] toys, propaganda videos,[18] and other means.[19][20] It is a sub-culture mainly applied to individuals in developed nations who are recruited to travel to conflict zones on jihad. For example, jihadi rap videos make participants look "more MTV than Mosque", according to NPR, which was the first to report on the phenomenon in 2010.[19]

Maajid Nawaz, founder and chairman of the anti-extremism think tank Quilliam, defines Jihadism as a violent subset of Islamism: "Islamism [is] the desire to impose any version of Islam over any society. Jihadism is the attempt to do so by force."[21]


Praying Muhjahideen in Kunar Province, Afghanistan (1987)

Islamic revivalism and Salafism (1990s to present)

A black flag reportedly used by Caucasian jihadists in 2002 displays the phrase al-jihad fi sabilillah above the takbir and two crossed swords.

According to Rudolph Peters, scholar of Islamic studies and history of Islam, contemporary traditionalist Muslims "copy phrases of the classical works on fiqh" in their writings on jihad; Islamic Modernists "emphasize the defensive aspect of jihad, regarding it as tantamount to bellum justum in modern international law; and the contemporary fundamentalists (Abul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, etc.) view it as a struggle for the expansion of Islam and the realization of Islamic ideals."[22]

Jihad has been propagated in modern fundamentalism beginning in the late 19th century, an ideology that arose in the context of struggles against colonial powers in North Africa in the late 19th century, as in the Mahdist War in Sudan, and notably in the mid-20th century by Islamic revivalist authors such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi.[23]

The term jihadism (earlier Salafi jihadism) has arisen in the 2000s to refer to the contemporary jihadi movements, the development of which was in retrospect traced to developments of Salafism paired with the origins of al-Qaeda in the Soviet-Afghan War during the 1990s.

Jihadism has been called an "offshoot" of Islamic revivalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The writings of Sayyid Qutb and Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag provide inspiration. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world."[24] It served to produce foot soldiers, leadership and organization. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam provided propaganda for the Afghan cause. After the war veteran jihadists returned to their home countries and dispersed to other sites of conflicts involving Muslim populations such as Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[25]

ISIL's territory in Iraq and Syria (in grey), at the time of its greatest territorial extent in May 2015.[26]

An explanation for jihadist willingness to kill civilians and self-professed Muslims on the grounds that they were actually apostates (takfir) is the vastly reduced influence of the traditional diverse class of ulama, often highly educated Islamic jurists. In "the vast majority" of Muslim countries during the post-colonial world of the 1950s and 1960s, the private religious endowments (awqaf) that had supported the independence of Islamic scholars and jurists for centuries were taken over by the state. The jurists were made salaried employees and the nationalist rulers naturally encouraged their employees (and their employees interpretations of Islam) to serve the rulers' interests. Inevitably the jurists came to be seen by the Muslim public as doing so.[27]

Into this vacuum of religious authority came aggressive proselytizing funded by tens of billions of dollars of petroleum-export money from Saudi Arabia.[28] The version of Islam being propagated (Saudi doctrine of Wahhabism) billed itself as a return to pristine, simple, straightforward Islam,[29] not one school among many, and not interpreting Islamic law historically or contextually, but the one, orthodox "straight path" of Islam.[29] Unlike the traditional teachings of the jurists who tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought and kept extremism marginalized, Wahhabism had "extreme hostility" to "any sectarian divisions within Islam".[29]

Shia jihad

The term jihadist is almost exclusively used to describe Sunni extremists.[30] In Syria, where there are thousands of foreign Muslim fighters engaged in the civil war, for example, non-Syrian Shia are often referred to as "militia", and Sunni foreigners as "jihadists" (or "would-be jihadists").[Note 3][Note 4] One who does use the term "Shia jihad" is Danny Postel, who complains that "this Shia jihad is largely left out of the dominant narrative."[33][34] Other authors see the ideology of "resistance" (Arabic: muqawama) as more dominant even among extremist Shia groups. Therefore, and for the disambiguation, they suggest to use the term "muqawamist" instead.[35]


According to Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, jihadism is driven by the idea that jihad is an "individual obligation" (fard 'ayn) incumbent upon all Muslims. This is in contrast with the belief of Muslims up until now (and by contemporary non-jihadists) that jihad is a "collective obligation" (fard al-kifaya) carried out according to orders of legitimate representatives of the Muslim community. Jihadist insist all Muslims should participate because (they believe) today's Muslim leaders are illegitimate and do not command the authority to ordain justified violence.[36]

Evolution of jihad

The Houthi flag, with the top saying "God is the greatest", the next line saying "Death to America", followed by "Death to Israel", followed by "A curse upon the Jews", and the bottom saying "Victory to Islam".

Some observers[37][38] have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad--from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-century Salafi jihadism.[39] According to the legal historian Sadarat Kadri,[37] during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any bid'ah (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[37] "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[37]

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[40] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the Quran and the Hadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard 'ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[41] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[42] and it could only be directed by the caliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[42] (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the Kharijia's jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim). Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in Hell.[43] The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[44]

Based on the 20th-century interpretations of Abul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Qaeda and others, many if not all of those self-proclaimed jihad fighters believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act of martyrdom and it brings you a special place in Heaven, not a special place in Hell; and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermind Non-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analyst Sebastian Gorka described the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."[38] Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, are thought to have been heavily influenced[39][45][46][47][48] by a 2004 work on jihad entitled Management of Savagery (Idarat at-Tawahhush),[39] written by Abu Bakr Naji[39] and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamic caliphate by first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.[49]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists and ideologues behind modern jihadist violence.[39][50][51][52] His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda member and former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIL and Boko Haram.[39][50][51][52] Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic as Fiqh al-Dima and referred to in English as The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood.[39][50][51][52][53] The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[39] The Guardians journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".[52] Charlie Winter of The Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[51] He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the literary corpus of ISIS--and, indeed, whatever comes after it--a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir, committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method--defensive or offensive--used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple--he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[51]

Clinical psychologist Chris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay, Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism (2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders Islamic terrorism a valid means of solution.[53]


President Reagan meeting with Afghan Mujahideen leaders in the Oval Office in 1983

Against Shia Muslims

The Syrian Civil War became a focus for Sunni fighters waging jihad on Shia Muslims. The al-Nusra Front is the largest jihadist group in Syria.[54] The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has called for jihad against the Syrian government and against that government's Shi'ite allies.[55] Saudi Arabia backs the jihad against the Shia in Syria using proxies.[56] Sunni jihadi converge in Syria from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, as well as other Arab states with Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Western countries.[57]

Against atheists

During the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, many Muslims received calls for a jihad against atheists.[58] Mujahideen were recruited from various countries including Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.[59] The conflict gradually turned from one against occupation to one seen as a jihad.[60]

See also


  1. ^ Gilles Kepel used the variants jihadist-salafist (p. 220), jihadism-salafism (p. 276), salafist-jihadism (p. 403) in his book Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002)
  2. ^ Use of "jihadism" has been criticized by at least one academic (Brachman): "'Jihadism' is a clumsy and controversial term. It refers to the peripheral current of extremist Islamic thought whose adherents demand the use of violence in order to oust non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to establishing true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or God's law. The expression's most significant limitation is that it contains the word Jihad, which is an important religious concept in Islam. For much of the Islamic world, Jihad simply refers to the internal spiritual campaign that one wages with oneself."[14]
  3. ^ For example: "The battle has drawn Shiite militias from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan on the side of Assad, even as Sunni would-be jihadists from around the world have filled the ranks of the many Islamist groups fighting his rule, including the Islamic State extremist group."[31]
  4. ^ The Iranian government has drawn from Afghan refugees living in Iran and the number of Afghans fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime has been estimated at "between 10,000 and 12,000".[32]


  1. ^ Compare: Firestone, Reuven (2012). ""Jihadism" as a new religious movement". In Hammer, Olav; Rothstein, Mikael (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 263-285. doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521196505.018. ISBN 978-0-521-19650-5. LCCN 2012015440. S2CID 156374198. 'Jihadism' is a term that has been constructed in Western languages to describe militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West. Western media have tended to refer to Jihadism as a military movement rooted in political Islam. [...] 'Jihadism,' like the word jihad out of which it is constructed, is a difficult term to define precisely. The meaning of Jihadism is a virtual moving target because it remains a recent neologism and no single, generally accepted meaning has been developed for it.
  2. ^ a b c Martin Kramer (Spring 2003). "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?". Middle East Quarterly. X (2): 65-77. Archived from the original on 2015-01-01. Retrieved . "French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism--an historical reference to the precursor of these movements--will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage. "Jihadist-Salafism" is defined by Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 219-22; and Guilain Deneoux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," Middle East Policy, June 2002, pp. 69-71."
  3. ^ DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (22 February 2018). "Jihad". Oxford Bibliographies - Islamic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/obo/9780195390155-0045. Archived from the original on 29 June 2016. Retrieved 2021.
  4. ^ Hekmatpour, Peyman (2018-01-01). "What do we know about the Islamic Radicalism: A meta-analysis of academic publications". Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  5. ^ Hekmatpour, Peyman; Burns, Thomas (2018-08-14). "Radicalism and Enantiodromia: A Trialectic of Modernity, Post-modernity, and Anti-modernity in the Islamic World". Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  6. ^ Kepel, Gilles (2021) [2000]. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Bloomsbury Revelations (5th ed.). London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 219-222. ISBN 9781350148598. OCLC 1179546717.
  7. ^ Schmid, Alex P.; Tinnes, Judith (December 2015). "Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective" (PDF). ICCT Research Papers. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. 6 (8). doi:10.19165/2015.1.08. ISSN 2468-0656. JSTOR resrep29430. S2CID 168669583. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 November 2020. Retrieved 2021.
  8. ^ Picker, Les (June 2016). "Where Are ISIS's Foreign Fighters Coming From?". The Digest. Vol. 6. Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research. Archived from the original on 23 October 2020. Retrieved 2021.
  9. ^ Hekmatpour, Peyman; Burns, Thomas J. (2019). "Perception of Western governments' hostility to Islam among European Muslims before and after ISIS: the important roles of residential segregation and education". The British Journal of Sociology. Wiley-Blackwell for the London School of Economics. 70 (5): 2133-2165. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12673. eISSN 1468-4446. ISSN 0007-1315. PMID 31004347.
  10. ^ Pokalova, Elena (2020). "Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Aberration from History or History Repeated?". Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters: Threats and Challenges to the West. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 11-58. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-31478-1. ISBN 978-3-030-31477-4.
  11. ^ a b "What is jihadism?". BBC News. 11 December 2014. Archived from the original on 3 December 2016. Retrieved 2016.
  12. ^ and by Guilain Deneoux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam," Middle East Policy, June 2002, pp. 69-71."
  13. ^ a b David Romano (2013). "Jihadists in Iraq". In John L. Esposito; Emad El-Din Shahin (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on 2017-02-15. Retrieved .
  14. ^ Brachman 2008, p. 4.
  15. ^ Steger, Manfred B. Globalization: A Short Introduction. 2009. Oxford University Publishing, p. 127.
  16. ^ Steve Emerson (April 15, 2013). "Jihad is Cool: Jihadist Magazines Recruit Young Terrorists". Family Security Matters. Archived from the original on March 11, 2015. Retrieved 2014.
  17. ^ J. Dana Stuster (April 29, 2013). "9 Disturbingly Good Jihadi Raps". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on August 23, 2014. Retrieved 2014.
  18. ^ Jytte Klausen (2012). "The YouTube Jihadists: A Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun's Propaganda Campaign". Perspectives on Terrorism. 6 (1). Archived from the original on August 26, 2014. Retrieved 2014.
  19. ^ a b Dina Temple-Raston (March 6, 2010). "Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters' Latest Weapon". National Public Radio. Archived from the original on October 6, 2014. Retrieved 2014.
  20. ^ Cheryl K. Chumley (June 27, 2014). "Terrorists go 'Jihad Cool,' use rap to entice young Americans". Washington Times. Archived from the original on September 3, 2014. Retrieved 2014.
  21. ^ Maajid Nawaz (June 14, 2016). "Admit It: These Terrorists Are Muslims". The Daily Beast. Archived from the original on June 25, 2017. Retrieved 2017.
  22. ^ Peters, Rudolph (1996). Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader. Princeton: Marcus Wiener. p. 150. ISBN 9004048545. Archived from the original on 2015-10-18. Retrieved .
  23. ^ Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Modern Terms: A Reader 2005, p. 107 and note p. 197. John Ralph Willis, "Jihad Fi Sabil Allah", in: In the Path of Allah: The Passion of al-Hajj ?Umar: an essay into the nature of charisma in Islam, Routledge, 1989, ISBN 978-0-7146-3252-0, 29-57. "Gibb [Mohammedanism, 2nd ed. 1953] rightly could conclude that one effect of the renewed emphasis in the nineteenth century on the Qur'an and Sunna in Muslim fundamentalism was to restore to jihad fi sabilillah much of the prominence it held in the early days of Islam. Yet Gibb, for all his perception, did not consider jihad within the context of its alliance to ascetic and revivalist sentiments, nor from the perspectives which left it open to diverse interpretations." (p. 31)
  24. ^ Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 174.
  25. ^ Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 156, 7.
  26. ^ Fairfield, Hannah; Wallace, Tim; Watkins, Derek (21 May 2015). "How ISIS Expands". The New York Times. New York. Archived from the original on 23 May 2015. Retrieved 2020.
  27. ^ Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2002). The Place of Tolerance in Islam by Khaled Abou El Fadl The Place of Tolerance in Islam. Beacon Press. p. 6. Retrieved 2015. The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists.
  28. ^ Kepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. p. 51. ISBN 9781845112578. Archived from the original on 2016-05-14. Retrieved . Well before the full emergence of Islamism in the 1970s, a growing constituency nicknamed 'petro-Islam' included Wahhabi ulemas and Islamist intellectuals and promoted strict implementation of the sharia in the political, moral and cultural spheres; this proto-movement had few social concerns and even fewer revolutionary ones.
  29. ^ a b c Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2002). The Place of Tolerance in Islam by Khaled Abou El Fadl The Place of Tolerance in Islam. Beacon Press. pp. 8-9. Retrieved 2015. The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists.
  30. ^ "The war against jihadists. Unsavoury allies". The Economist. 6 September 2014. Archived from the original on 26 August 2016. Retrieved 2016.
  31. ^ Bulos, Nabih (17 August 2016). "Soldiers on both sides see the fight for Aleppo as a battle between jihadists". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 11 October 2016. Retrieved 2016.
  32. ^ Heistein, Ari; West, James (20 November 2015). "Syria's Other Foreign Fighters: Iran's Afghan and Pakistani Mercenaries". National Interest. Archived from the original on 11 October 2016. Retrieved 2016.
  33. ^ Danny Postel; Laura Secor (Fall 2016). "Theaters of Coercion: Review of 'Children of Paradise: The Struggle for the Soul of Iran'". Democracy Journal (42). Archived from the original on 14 October 2016. Retrieved 2016.
  34. ^ see also: Smyth, Phillip (2 October 2013). "Foreign Shia jihadists in Syria". abc.net.au. Archived from the original on 28 August 2016. Retrieved 2016.
  35. ^ "Are Shia Militias Jihadist?". magazine.zenith.me. 2017-12-20. Archived from the original on 2018-09-19. Retrieved .
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  38. ^ a b Gorka, Sebastian (3 October 2009). "Understanding History's Seven Stages of Jihad". Combating Terrorism Center. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 2015.
  39. ^ a b c d e f g h Ajjoub, Orwa (2021). The Development of the Theological and Political Aspects of Jihadi-Salafism (PDF). Lund: Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET) at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University. pp. 1-28. ISBN 978-91-7895-772-9. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 February 2021. Retrieved 2021.
  40. ^ Lewis, Bernard (1988). The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 72. ISBN 0-226-47693-6 – via Internet Archive.
  41. ^ Khadduri, Majid (1955). "5. Doctrine of Jihad" (PDF). War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 60. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2015. Retrieved 2015. [Unlike the five pillars of Islam, jihad was to be enforced by the state.] ... 'unless the Muslim community is subjected to a sudden attack and therefore all believers, including women and children are under the obligation to fight--[jihad of the sword] is regarded by all jurists, with almost no exception, as a collective obligation of the whole Muslim community,' meaning that 'if the duty is fulfilled by a part of the community it ceases to be obligatory on others'.
  42. ^ a b Kadri, Sadakat (2012). Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia. London: Macmillan Publishers. pp. 150-151. ISBN 978-0099523277.
  43. ^ Lewis, Bernard (2003) [1967]. The Assassins, a radical sect in Islam. Basic Books. p. xi-xii. ISBN 978-0786724550. Retrieved 2015.
  44. ^ Edwards, Richard; Zuhur, Sherifa (12 May 2008). The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and. ABC-CLIO. p. 553. ISBN 978-1851098422.
  45. ^ McCoy, Terrence (August 12, 2014). "The calculated madness of the Islamic State's horrifying brutality". Washington Post. Retrieved 2015.
  46. ^ Crooke, Alastair (30 August 2014). "The ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq". The World Post. Retrieved 2015.
  47. ^ Hassan, Hassan (8 February 2015). "Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it". The Guardian. Retrieved 2015.
  48. ^ McCoy, Terrence (12 August 2014). "The calculated madness of the Islamic State's horrifying brutality". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2014.
     • Crooke, Alastair (30 June 2014). "The ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq". HuffPost.
     • Hassan, Hassan (8 February 2015). "Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it". The Guardian.
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  53. ^ a b Stout, Chris E. (2018) [2017]. "The Psychology of Terrorism". Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism: New Psychology to Understand, Face, and Defuse the Threat. Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 5-6. ISBN 978-1440851926. OCLC 994829038.
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  58. ^ The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global - Page 68, Fawaz A. Gerges - 2009 -
  59. ^ Aging Early: Collapse of the Oasis of Liberties - Page 47, Mirza Aman - 2009
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