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Canadian administrative law is the body of law that addresses the actions and operations of governments and governmental agencies in Canada. That is, the law concerns the manner in which courts can review the decisions of administrative decision-makers (ADMs) such as a board, tribunal, commission, agency or Crown minister, when he or she exercises ministerial discretion.
Administrative law is concerned primarily with the legality of administrative decision making and with issues of procedural fairness (rights for those affected by the decision to participate in the decision making process). Administrative law concerns the interpretation of statutes and rules of government operations. Courts, when applying administrative law, look to ensure that administrative or governmental actors and bodies observe and act within the legal limits on their authority.
The powers of an ADM are primarily created by statute, which is known as the "enabling statute". These powers are limited by the legislative authority of the enabling government provided under section 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Superior Courts (known as Section 96 Courts) have an inherent power at common law to review any decision of an ADM. A judicial review allows for the court to consider the entire decision-making process, including the process, the findings of fact and of law. The power of judicial review is found either in the enabling statute or by virtue of the common law. The common law powers are derived from the four original writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus.
These powers are also frequently limited by privative clauses or finality clauses within the enabling statute. A privative clause will declare the ADMs decision is "final and conclusive" and/or that the ADM has "exclusive jurisdiction" over the matter, effectively removing any power of review. As established in Crevier v Quebec (AG),  2 SCR 220, the Constitution requires that the courts be able to supervise errors of ADMs and so the legislature cannot completely oust the courts from that power, nor can an ADM completely replace the courts.
Courts may review a decision through a statutory appeal when such appeal is explicitly provided by the enabling statute that created the administrative body. The scope of such appeal is defined and described by the terms of the enabling statute.
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada held that where a statute provides for an appeal from an administrative decision to a court, it has subjected the administrative regime to appellate oversight and indicated that it expects the court to scrutinize such administrative decisions on an appellate basis. 
A court hearing such an appeal must apply appellate standards of review to the administrative decision. :37 This means that when considering questions of law raised in the appeal, the court would apply the standard of correctness. :37 When reviewing questions of fact (or questions of mixed fact and law when the legal principle is not readily extricable), the court applies the standard of "palpable and overriding error". :37 The legislature is free to deviate from this appellate standard of review by prescribing a different standard in the applicable statute. :37
The courts' power of substantive review allows it to consider the content of an ADM's decision and decide whether it was unreasonable to warrant sending it back for reconsideration. Prior to the landmark decision of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 , courts undertake a standard of review analysis to determine the level of scrutiny that should be applied in the review of an administrative decision.
The analysis, as set out in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, first asks if the standard of review has already been decided for cases of this type-such decided standard of review presumptively applies to the review at hand. Where the court is called upon to determine a standard of review for a decision for the first time, the court will consider a number of questions in this determination, such as:
After considering these presumptions, courts should consider the four contextual factors first established in Pushpanathan:
The analysis is highly contextual. None of the factors are determinative and will vary based on the circumstances. Where deference was intended the courts will review the ADM on the basis of reasonableness. Where little or no deference is intended, the ADM will be reviewed on a standard of correctness.
The presumption that the standard of reasonableness applies may be rebutted, and specifically, in two situations: (i) where the legislation has indicated that a standard of correctness applies, and (ii) where the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness applies.  The second situation will engaged for certain categories of questions, such as constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole and questions related to the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies. 
In Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly did away with the contextual analysis for standard of review established in Dunsmuir, in an effort to streamline and simplify the standard of review framework. :47 In so doing, the Supreme Court of Canada also sought to give greater effect and meaning to an express statutory right of appeal, which is understood to be the key factor representing legislative intention on the standard of review. :39 The presence of an express statutory right of appeal in the enabling statute is understood to mean that the legislature intended the courts to play an appellate role, and apply a less deferential standard of review. :39 Concomitantly, it is presumed from the lack of a statutory of appeal that the Legislature intended the courts to apply a more deferential standard of review, namely, the standard of reasonableness. :39 It is unnecessary to undertake a contextual analysis to decide what standard of review should apply.
There are two standards of review available to courts, following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick: reasonableness and correctness. A third standard of review, patent unreasonableness, was abolished in Dunsmuir.
Reasonableness is the more deferential standard that a court can give to an ADM. Where the decision is a matter of law, a mix of fact and law or a discretionary decision it is said that the decision is unreasonable where the decision is "not supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination". In other words, it is unreasonable where "there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived."
Correctness is the less deferential standard that a court can give to an ADM. The court will give no deference at all and will judge the decision on the basis of whether it is correct in law. A court may substitute its own opinion for that of the ADM.
Certain matters have been held by the court to always warrant a correctness standard: questions of constitutional law and division of powers, a "true question of jurisdiction" (in determining whether an administrative decision-maker has properly exercised its authority granted under a statute), questions of general law that are both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's specialized area of expertise, and questions regarding jurisdictional lines between two or more competing specialized tribunals.
Patent unreasonableness was the highest level of deference that the court could give to an ADM, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick (2008). Under this standard of review, a court would only substitute its own reasoning for the lower decision-maker's if it was so egregious as to be patently unreasonable. This standard was found to be dissatisfactory as it allowed certain decisions that were unreasonable but not patently unreasonable to be upheld, giving rise to situations where certain people were told to accept an irrational decision of an administrative body.
The Supreme Court abolished the patent unreasonableness standard in favour of retaining the two standards of correctness and reasonableness. This does not necessarily mean that cases decided on the "patently unreasonable" standard shall cease to be of any use. Rather, in practice, they are often referred to as examples falling below the threshold of "reasonableness", and remain helpful in that regard.
There is, however, one exception to the abolition of the patently unreasonable standard. British Columbia has codified the patently unreasonable standard in the Administrative Tribunals Act. Because a statute is held to be superior to the common law, this legislation preserves the patently unreasonable standard in British Columbia despite the Supreme Court ruling in Dunsmuir that the standard no longer exists.
Procedural fairness concerns the entitlement of rights during the deliberation of a case before an ADM. These rights flow from two principles of natural justice, the right to be heard (audi alteram partem) and right to be judged impartially (nemo judex in sua causa). These rights can be conveyed by the Canadian Charter, "umbrella" legislation, the ADM's constituting legislation, and the common law.
Legitimate expectation of procedural fairness applies:
"When a public authority had promised to follow a certain procedure, it is in the interest of good administration that it should act fairly and should implement its promise, so long as implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty." In this way the courts have found procedural fairness through a promise by an ADM. There are requirements for what constitutes a legitimate expectation.
According to Canadian Union of Public Employees v Ontario (Minister of Labour), if the promise is clear, unambiguous and unqualified representation as to a procedure, then it creates a legitimate expectation. This applies also to an established practice or conduct of a given ADM.
Legitimate expectation will not apply when dealing with a legislative decision, promises that conflict with statutory duties, and substantive promises.
The common law imposes a minimum duty of fairness in certain administrative proceedings. The duty can only be invoked where the circumstances satisfy a threshold based on three factors set out by the Supreme Court in Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19.
Where the circumstances satisfy the threshold test to invoke a duty of fairness a claimant will be entitled to certain participatory rights including pre-hearing rights, such as rights related notice, disclosure, discovery, and delay, as well as hearing rights, such as rights related to the form of hearing, counsel, examinations, and reasons for judgment.
Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) clarified administrative law in Canada in relation to both substantive matters (discretionary decision making) and procedural matters (procedural fairness).
The content of the duty of fairness depends on the type of right and the circumstances of the case. There are five factors that affect the content of this duty:
With respect to discretion, historically, the standard of review for discretionary decisions applied by the courts was that of correctness. However, this changed in Baker where the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the awkward line between questions of law and discretion. The court recognized that the 'pragmatic and functional' approach, as outlined in Pushpanathan, should be applied when looking at issues of discretion. In addition, courts are able to apply a standard of reasonableness to discretionary decision making.
Administrative tribunals must be free from an appearance of bias - that is, a reasonable person must conclude that an administrative decision-maker is sufficiently free of factors that could interfere with his or her ability to make impartial judgments (commonly known as the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test) This is derived from the natural justice principle of nemo judex in sua causa, or the right to be judged impartially.
Independence is one important indicator of whether there is an appearance of bias in an administrative body. Although administrative independence is not required to be as strict as judicial independence, there are still certain minimum requirements such as security of tenure and independent administrative control. However, administrative independence is not guaranteed under the constitution, and can be ousted by statutory language.
Once a court has determined that there has been a reasonable apprehension of bias, the decision in question must be void ab initio, as there is no remedy for the damage created by the apprehension of bias.
The concept of an "administrative decision" encompasses a wide spectrum ranging from the exercise of Ministerial discretion to an adjudication of legal rights by a statutory tribunal to recommendations made by a board of inquiry.