The Great Firewall of China (GFW; simplified Chinese: ?; traditional Chinese: ?; pinyin: ) is the combination of legislative actions and technologies enforced by the People's Republic of China to regulate the Internet domestically. Its role in Internet censorship in China is to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down cross-border internet traffic. The effect includes: limiting access to foreign information sources, blocking foreign internet tools (e.g. Google search,Facebook,Twitter,Wikipedia, and others) and mobile apps, and requiring foreign companies to adapt to domestic regulations.
Besides censorship, the GFW has also influenced the development of China's internal internet economy by nurturing domestic companies and reducing the effectiveness of products from foreign internet companies. The techniques deployed by the Chinese government to maintain control of the Great Firewall can include modifying search results for terms, such as they did following Ai Weiwei's arrest, and petitioning global conglomerates to remove content, as happened when they petitioned Apple to remove the Quartz business news publication's app from its Chinese App Store after reporting on the 2019 Hong Kong protests.
The Great Firewall was formerly operated by the SIIO, as part of the Golden Shield Project. Since 2013, the firewall is technically operated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which is the entity in charge of translating the Communist Party of China's will into technical specifications.
As mentioned in the "One country, two systems" principle, China's special administrative regions (SARs) such as Hong Kong and Macau are not affected by the firewall, as SARs have their own governmental and legal systems and therefore enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department has reported that the central government authorities have closely monitored Internet use in these regions.
The term Great Firewall of China is a portmanteau of firewall and the Great Wall of China, and was first used in print by Geremie Barmé in 1997. The term started its use in Beijing in 1996 by Stephen Guerin of Redfish Group, a Beijing-based web consultancy. 1996 interviews of Guerin by CNN's Andrea Koppel and NPR's Mary Kay Magistad included Guerin discussing China's "reversing the firewall".
A favorite saying of Deng Xiaoping's in the early 1980s, "If you open the window, both fresh air and flies will be blown in", is considered to be the political and ideological basis of the GFW Project.[nb 1] The saying is related to a period of the economic reform of China that became known as the "socialist market economy". Superseding the political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, the reform led China towards a market economy and opened up the market for foreign investors. Nonetheless, despite the economic freedom, values and political ideas of the Communist Party of China have had to be protected by "swatting flies" of other unwanted ideologies.
The Internet in China arrived in 1994, as the inevitable consequence of and supporting tool for a "socialist market economy". Gradually, while Internet availability has been increasing, the Internet has become a common communication platform and tool for trading information.
The Ministry of Public Security took initial steps to control Internet use in 1997, when it issued comprehensive regulations governing its use. The key sections, Articles 4-6, are:
Individuals are prohibited from using the Internet to: harm national security; disclose state secrets; or injure the interests of the state or society. Users are prohibited from using the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit information that incites resistance to the PRC Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations; promoting the overthrow of the government or socialist system; undermining national unification; distorting the truth, spreading rumors, or destroying social order; or providing sexually suggestive material or encouraging gambling, violence, or murder. Users are prohibited from engaging in activities that harm the security of computer information networks and from using networks or changing network resources without prior approval.
In 1998, the Communist Party of China feared that the China Democracy Party (CDP) would breed a powerful new network that the party elites might not be able to control. The CDP was immediately banned, followed by arrests and imprisonment. That same year, the GFW project was started. The first part of the project lasted eight years and was completed in 2006. The second part began in 2006 and ended in 2008. On 6 December 2002, 300 people in charge of the GFW project from 31 provinces and cities throughout China participated in a four-day inaugural "Comprehensive Exhibition on Chinese Information System". At the exhibition, many western high-tech products, including Internet security, video monitoring and human face recognition were purchased. It is estimated that around 30,000-50,000 police were employed in this gigantic project.
While the United States and several other western countries passed laws creating computer crimes beginning in the 1970s, China had no such legislation until 1997. That year, China's sole legislative body, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed CL97, a law that criminalizes "cyber crimes", which it divided into two broad categories: crimes that target computer networks and crimes carried out over computer networks. Behavior illegal under the latter category includes among many things the dissemination of pornographic material and the usurping of "state secrets."
Some Chinese judges were critical of CL97, calling it ineffective and unenforceable. However, the NPC claimed it intentionally left the law "flexible" so that it could be open to future interpretation and development. Given the gaps in the law, the central government of China relies heavily on its administrative body, the State Council, to determine what falls under the definitions, and their determinations are not required to go through the NPC legislative process. As a result, the CPC has ended up relying heavily on state regulation to carry out CL97.
The latter definition of online activities punishable under CL97, or "crimes carried out over computer networks" is used as justification for the Great Firewall and can be cited when the government blocks any ISP, gateway connections, or any access to anything on the internet. The definition also includes using the internet to distribute information considered "harmful to national security," and using the internet to distribute information considered "harmful to public order, social stability, and Chinese morality." The central government relies heavily on its State Council regulators to determine what specific online behavior and speech fall under these definitions.
The reasons behind the Internet censorship in China include:
As part of the Great Firewall, beginning in 2003 China started the Golden Shield Project , a massive surveillance and censoring system, the hardware for which was provided by mostly U.S. companies, including Cisco Systems. The project was completed in 2006 and is now carried out in buildings with machines manned by civilians and supervised by China's national police force, the Public Security Bureau (PSB). The main operating procedures of the gatekeepers at the Golden Shield Project include monitoring domestic websites and email and searching for politically sensitive language and calls to protest. When damaging content is found, local PSB officials can be dispatched to investigate or make arrests. However, by late 2007 the Golden Shield Project proved to operate sporadically at best, as users had long adapted to internet blocking by using proxy servers, among other strategies, to make communications and circumnavigate to blocked content.
Internet cafés, an extremely popular way of getting online in developing countries where fewer people can afford a personal computer, are regulated by the Chinese government and by local Chinese government officials. Minors (in China, those under the age of 18) are not allowed into Internet cafés, although this law is widely ignored and when enforced, has spurred the creation of underground "Black Web Bars" visited by those underage. As of 2008 internet cafés were required to register every customer in a log when they used the internet there; these records may be confiscated by local government officials and the PSB. To illustrate local regulation of internet cafés, in one instance, a government official in the town of Gedong lawfully banned internet cafés from operating in the town because he believed them to be harmful to minors, who frequented them to play online games (including those considered violent) and surf the internet. However, internet cafés in this town simply went underground and most minors were not deterred from visiting them.
In May 2015, China indefinitely blocked access to the Chinese-language Wikipedia. In contrast (as of 2018), the English-language popflock.com resource was blocked only rarely and intermittently. China in 2017 discussed plans for its own version of Wikipedia. As of May 2019, all language versions of popflock.com resource have been blocked by the Chinese government.
One function of the Chinese firewall is to selectively prevent content from being accessed. It is mostly made of Cisco, Huawei and Semptian hardware Not all sensitive content get blocked; in 2007 scholar Jedidiah R. Crandall and others argued that the main purpose is not to block 100%, but rather to flag and to warn, in order to encourage self-censorship. An illustrative but incomplete list of tactics includes:
|IP range ban using black holes||The Chinese firewall maintains a list of IP ranges that are automatically dropped (network black-holing).
Because of the complexity to maintain a big, up-to-date banned network list with dynamic IPs, and because this method has proven not to be compatible with services using content delivery networks, it is usually used as last resort and other blocking methods are preferred (such as filtering based on QoS).
|DNS spoofing, filtering and redirection||One part of the Chinese firewall is made of liar DNS servers and DNS hijackers returning incorrect IP addresses. Studies seems to point out that this censorship is keyword-based.|
Contrary to popular belief, foreign DNS resolvers such as Google Public DNS IP address 188.8.131.52 are reported to work correctly inside the country; however, these DNS servers are also subject to hijacking as their connections aren't encrypted: DNS queries do reach the DNS server, but if the request matches a banned keyword, the firewall will inject a fake DNS reply before the legitimate DNS reply arrives.
|URL filtering using transparent proxies||The Chinese firewall is made of transparent proxies filtering web traffic. These proxies scan the requested URI, the "Host" Header and the content of the web page (for HTTP requests) or the Server Name Indication (for HTTPS requests) for target keywords.|
Like for DNS filtering, this method is keyword based. Encrypting the Server Name Indication can be used to bypass this method of filtering. It is currently in development by the IETF, and is offered as a setting in Firefox.
|Quality of service filtering||Since 2012, the GFW is able to "learn, filter and block" users based on traffic behavior, using deep packet inspection. This method was originally developed for blocking VPNs and has been extended to become part of the standard filtering system of the GFW. The method works by mirroring all traffic (using a network tap) to a dedicated analytics unit, that will then deliver a score for each destination IP based on how suspicious the connection is. This score is then used to determine a packet loss rate to be implemented by routers of the Chinese firewall, resulting in a slowed connection on the client side. The method aims to slow down traffic to such an extent that the request times out on the client side, thus effectively having succeeded in blocking the service altogether.
It is believed that the analytics system is using side-channel (such as the handshake headers, and packet sizes) to estimate how suspicious is a connection. It is able to detect traffic protocols (such as SSH tunneling, VPN or Tor protocols), and can measure packets Entropy to detect encrypted-over-encrypted traffic (such as HTTPS over an SSL tunnel).
The sensitivity can be turned up during sensitive political events.
This attack may be resisted by using a pluggable transport such as Format Transforming Encryption or Dust2 in order to mimic 'innocent' traffic, and never connect to 'suspicious' IPs by always having the circumvention software turned on, yet not proxy unblocked content, and the software itself never directly connect to a central server.
|Packet forging and TCP reset attacks||The Chinese firewall may arbitrarily terminate TCP transmissions, using packet forging. The blocking is performed using a TCP reset attack. This attack does not block TCP requests nor TCP replies, but send a malicious TCP RST packet to the sender, simulating an end-of-connection.
Side channel analysis seems to indicate that TCP Reset are coming from an infrastructure collocated or shared with QoS filtering routers. This infrastructure seems to update the scoring system : if a previous TCP connection is blocked by the filter, future connection attempts from both sides may also be blocked for short period of times (up to few hours).
|Man-in-the-middle attacks with TLS||The Chinese National Intelligence Law theoretically allows the Chinese government to request and use the root certificate from any Chinese certificate authority, such as CNNIC, to make MITM attacks with valid certificates.
Multiple TLS incidents also happened in the last decade, before the creation of the law:
On 20 October 2014, iCloud SSL certificate was replaced with a self-signed certificate in China. It is believed that the Chinese government discovered a vulnerability on Apple devices and was exploiting it.
On 20 March 2015, Google detected valid certificates for Google signed by CNNIC in Egypt. In response of this event, and after a deeper investigation, CNNIC certificate has been removed by some browsers. Because of the removal being based on proofs and not suspicion, no other Chinese certificate authority has been removed from web browsers, and some have been added since then.
In addition to previously discussed techniques, the CAC is also using active probing in order to identify and block network services that would help escaping the firewall. Multiple services such as Tor or VPN providers reported receiving unsolicited TCP/IP connections shortly after legitimate use, for the purported purpose of network enumeration of services, in particular TLS/SSL and Tor services, with the aim of facilitating IP blocking. For example, shortly after a VPN request is issued by a legitimate Chinese VPN client and passes outbound though the Great Firewall to a hidden VPN IP, the Great Firewall may detect the activity and issue its own active probe to verify the nature of the previously-unknown VPN IP and, if the probe confirms the IP is part of a blacklisted VPN, blacklist the IP. This attack can be circumvented with the Obfs4 protocol, which relies on an out-of-band shared secret.
The Great Firewall harvests the IPs of Tor and VPN servers from the official distribution channels, and enumerates them. The strategy to resist this attack is to limit the quantity of proxy IPs revealed to each user and making it very difficult for users to create more than one identity. Academics have proposed solutions such as Salmon. It is also quite helpful to have dynamic IPs for proxy servers. Resilient proxy distribution still remains a major research question.
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The Great Firewall in China has direct influence on the population's belief and way of thinking.
It is mainly used by the Chinese government to promote and encourage right thinking by censoring dissident ideas. One of the main goals of the Great Chinese firewall is to create an environment where people have the same values. Therefore, the GFW is a political tool using Chinese citizens to promote Chinese Communist Party ideas, such as:
Because the social environment of an individual does not necessarily change when moving country, there are multiple reports of Chinese users still promoting these ideas even when they are going abroad and are not under direct influence of the GFW. It is largely admitted that the GFW, as well as other means, is playing a non-negligible role in keeping stable, patriotic and CAC-compliant values.
Aside from the social control aspect, the Great Firewall also acts as a form of trade protectionism that has allowed China to grow its own internet giants, such as Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu. China has its own version of many foreign web properties, for example: Tencent Video (YouTube), Tencent Weibo (Twitter), Qzone (Facebook), WeChat (WhatsApp), Ctrip (Orbitz and others), Zhihu (Quora). With nearly one quarter of the global internet population (700 million users), the internet behind the GFW can be considered a "parallel universe" to the Internet that exists outside.
Because the Great Firewall blocks destination IP addresses and domain names and inspects the data being sent or received, a basic censorship circumvention strategy is to use proxy nodes and encrypt the data. Most circumvention tools combine these two mechanisms:
Non-proxy circumvention strategies include:
People attempting to develop circumvention software for China should implement the following:
Reporters Without Borders suspects that countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, Zimbabwe and Belarus have obtained surveillance technology from China, although the censorship in these countries is less stringent than in China.
Despite strict government regulations, some Chinese people continue to protest against their government's attempt to censor the Internet. The more covert protesters set up secure SSH and VPN connections using tools such as UltraSurf. They can also utilize the widely available proxies and virtual private networks to fanqiang (, "climb over the wall"), or bypass the GFW. Active protest is not absent. Chinese people post their grievances online, and on some occasions, have been successful. In 2003, the death of Sun Zhigang, a young migrant worker, sparked an intense, widespread online response from the Chinese public, despite the risk of the government's punishment. A few months later, Premier Wen Jiabao abolished the Chinese law that led to the death of Sun. Ever since, dissent has regularly created turmoil on the Internet in China. Also in January 2010, when Google announced that it will no longer censor its Web search results in China, even if this means it might have to shut down its Chinese operations altogether, many Chinese people went to the company's Chinese offices to display their grievances and offer gifts, such as flowers, fruits and cigarettes.
Critics argue that the GFW is a consequence of China's paranoia of the potential that the Internet has of spreading opposition to their one-party rule. Other arguments given against China are that their method of having a limited Internet impedes freedom of speech and that it holds them down, economically speaking, by discouraging innovation, disapproving communication of important ideas and prohibiting firms the use of certain services that they use. It is also thought to be a detrimental approach for students and professors since they do not have access to resources which promote the sharing of work and ideas for a more comprehensive learning.
Another important argument against the GFW and fear that the critics have is that if other big countries begin following China's approach, the whole purpose of the creation of the Internet could be put in jeopardy. If like-minded countries are successful in imposing the same restrictions on their inhabitants and globalized online companies, then the free global exchange of information could cease to exist.
The United States Trade Representative's (USTR) "National Trade Estimate Report" in 2016 referred the China's digital Great Firewall: "China's filtering of cross-border Internet traffic has posed a significant burden to foreign suppliers." Claude Barfield, the American Enterprise Institute's expert of International trade, suggested that the U.S. government should bring a case against the Firewall, a huge trade barrier, in the World Trade Organization in January 2017. 8 of the 24 more trafficked websites in China have been blocked by The Great Firewall. This has created a burden to foreign suppliers who rely on these websites to sell their products or services.The lobby's 2016 business climate survey showed 79 percent of its members reported a negative impact on business due to internet censorship.
According to Stephen Rosen, the GFW is reflective of the Chinese government's fear of civil disobedience or rebellion among the Chinese population against the Chinese Communist Party's rule:
If you want to know what people are worried about look at what they spend their money on. If you're afraid of burglars you buy a burglar alarm. What are the Chinese spending their money on? We're told from Chinese figures they're spending on the People's Armed Police, the internal security force is about as big as they're spending on the regular military. This whole great firewall of Chinese, this whole massive effort to control the internet, this effort to use modern information technology not to disseminate information, empowering individuals, but to make people think what you want them to think and to monitor their behavior so that you can isolate and suppress them. That's because this is a regime which is fundamentally afraid of its own people. And it's fundamentally hostile to them.